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The impact of the GDR in regards to Anglo-FRG relations 1949-1989

The final GDR parade in October 1989 – Getty Images

Resembling both an aggravating and persistent thorn in Britain’s side, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) proved to be somewhat of a nuisance regarding the United Kingdom’s (UK) relations with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) throughout the second half of the twentieth century. The core existence of this said thorn created issues from as early as 1955, with the FRG implementing the Hallstein Doctrine, partly in response to the fear of other states recognising the establishment of the GDR in 1949 as legitimate. This severely limited Britain’s ability to develop any serious diplomatic relations with the GDR. Ramifications of this would have included loss of trade with the FRG and politically ostracising them.[1] Other factors including the Berlin uprising of June 1953, the erection of the Berlin wall in 1961, and, the reclusive nature of the dictatorial socialist hermit state, had initially benefited British and FRG relations. These aggressive communist actions, implemented by the GDR, tarnished their reputation on the international stage, and, provided many justifications for Britain to draw closer to the FRG throughout the 1950s. A democratic nation would be reluctant to be viewed allying with such an oppressive regime. Following, the implementation of Ostpolitik and the Détente period in the 1960s and 1970s, the relationship begun to deteriorate. The UK and FRG established communications with the GDR, and eventually recognised it as a sovereign nation state, ergo helping to develop diplomatic relations.[2] Britain’s crippling political and economic issues in the 1970s resulted in its relations with the FRG and GDR taking a backseat in terms of priorities. Britain struggled to deal with the powerful influences of Trade Unions, creating the three day working week.[3] The thorn that represents the GDR would soon turn septic in the 1980s, with the desire for re-unification, and the eventual collapse of the Berlin wall putting immense strain on the UK and FRG relationship. This work aims to explore these developments in detail, and explain why, for much of its existence, the GDR had scant impact on British and FRG relations.  

Following the capitulation of the Nazis in May 1945, Germany was divided into 4 zones. Berlin itself, whilst in the Soviet zone was further divided. Britain, France and America combined their zones to form the Federal Republic of Germany on 23rd May 1949. This was followed by the Soviets establishing their respective zone as the German Democratic Republic on 7th October 1949.

Following the cessation of the Second World War, and the subsequent creation of two Germanies in 1949, the United Kingdom along with the United States, needed to ensure a strong Europe to prevent the spread of Communism, in line with the Truman Doctrine.[4] The allies aim was to also deter any possible future Westward advancements planned by the Soviets. During most of the early 1950s, Europe was not a priority for Britain. Indeed, it is argued ‘In Britain’s order of political priorities Europe had occupied third place since the war, after the Commonwealth and the USA’. [5] Furthermore, the main strain on the FRG and Britain’s relationship in 1950 was not the threat of the GDR, but instead, the actions of the British Army on the Rhine (BAOR). The British army had numerous encounters with the local German populace, and the damaging and drunken behaviour of some British troops had fuelled an anti-British sentiment in some parts of the country. The Communist Party of Germany (KPD) used these incidents as propaganda to encourage more sympathy with the GDR and communist causes, instead of with Britain and its ‘occupation’ of Germany. Peter Speiser highlights this in his book The British Army on the Rhine in which he stated, ‘The communists specifically linked the federal government with the Allied troops and demanded, “Out with Adenauer, Out with the Occupation troops”’. [6] Nevertheless, Britain and the USA were adamant that an independent FRG would join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), as demonstrated when British and American troops ceased their occupation of the FRG in May 1955. This was carried out despite a potential risk of upsetting the KPD and their associates in the GDR.  The desire for Britain to advance its relationship with the FRG is shared with the USA and can be seen in a cartoon drawn by Victor Weisz. The cartoon depicts US President Eisenhour trying to coerce German Chancellor Adenauer to join NATO, by singing the infamous wartime song Lilli Marlene [7]. Several prominent figures, including Sir Winston Churchill, Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery and Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, all believed a military alliance of Western European states was needed to curtail the spread of communism. [8] It would be wise to mention the wider context of the Cold War at this time. Both East and West Germany were newly formed nations in the 1950s and were each busy developing their own states with their retrospective allies. Foreign diplomacy was not a top priority for the GDR. Instead, it was focusing heavily on the post-war clean up, and setting out the economic future of the socialist state, with policies such as land reform, and the five-year plan from 1951-1955. [9] This thus supports the original point that the impact the GDR had on British and FRG relations was very limited, as the two states drew closer in the 1950s and entered a military alliance together.

“His Comrade, Our Ally”. West German poster promoting the admittance of the Bundeswehr into NATO circa 1955/56

The 1960s and 1970s saw Britain’s relations with the FRG begin to alter and become strained. Problems originated primarily with Britain’s slow emerging desire to recognise the GDR through back door routes, whilst still officially adhering to Bonn’s Hallstein Doctrine. In November 1962, Prime Minister Macmillan’s Private Secretary stated that ‘the best solution would be a tacit acceptance by both sides of the status quo’. [10] In other words, the Soviets accept the Western allies’ presence and rights in Berlin, and the West accept the existence of the GDR. Continued pressures by Macmillan’s government to try and recognise the GDR appeared to show Britain as appeasing the Soviets and Khrushchev, much to the dismay of the FRG and USA. [11] Further strains on the relations emerged only a year later, with the signing of the 1963 Test Ban Treaty. The FRG protested vehemently when the GDR, a non-recognised state was allowed to accede to the international treaty. [12] Britain was attempting to adhere to US President Kennedys policy of a Détente Period, following the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. There was much difficulty in getting the Soviets to sign the treaty. The British Foreign Office believed that the FRG was simply exaggerating claims that the GDR signing of the treaty would help to legitimise the regime. [13] Despite Bonn’s protests, London would only compromise so far, as to publicly agree with the FRGs Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröders request. It stated that ‘despite signing the nuclear test ban treaty, no treaty like relations come into existence between them and territories they have not recognised as states.’ [14] Britain would not go as far as to recommend the GDR be removed from the treaty and continued to insist privately that the FRG was making a ‘fuss over nothing’. [15] Further actions influenced by the GDR, that damaged Anglo-West German relations, were the roles of Britain’s trade unions and Labour party. Even though the Trade Union Congress (TUC) was officially opposed to the workings of the East German Freier Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (Free German Trade Union Federation or FDGB) many study visits were organised for union workers to visit the GDR and see the wonders of a so-called socialist utopia. [16]

US President John F. Kennedy signs the 1963 Test Ban treaty – History Today

This distorted image of the GDR, which was struggling with a severe lack of consumer goods, and a flailing economy, began to influence the opinions of those in the Labour party who were closely associated with British trade unions. They saw the GDR as a viable anti-capitalist alternative to the FRG. [17] Following the success of Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik that aimed to promote the Social Democratic Party (SPD) policy of rapprochement with the GDR, in contrast to the previous Christian Democrat Union (CDU), which maintained to curtail its power and influence, Bonn moved to try and co-exist with the GDR. Following the establishment of diplomatic relations between the FRG and GDR in 1974, it was becoming further accepted to publicly acknowledge, and deal with East Germany by the British, without the fear of causing major upset to the FRG, who had now abandoned the Hallstein Doctrine. [18] Britain, however, was still unable to deal with the GDR without having to consider the views of the FRG. As the first East German ambassador to Britain, Karl-Heinz Kern put it to former Prime Minister Edward Heath in 1979 ‘bilateral relations were never able to break free from Bonn’s influence in what was essentially a triangular relationship’. [19] Consequently, whilst not having a directly negative impact on the relations between the FRG and UK, the simple fact of the GDRs existence meant that the British had to always consider them in their dealings with West Germany.

At the turn of the decade, the relationship between Britain and the FRG would be tested to breaking point, especially following the election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979, and Helmut Kohl in 1982. Indeed, Thatcher’s unwavering and outdated war time paranoia of a united Germany was so real, that the US feared she may indeed ally with Soviets, who she saw as an ‘essential balance to German power’. [20] Thatcher now faced two Germanies in which she did not believe in. A staunch opponent of socialism and of German re-unification meant she was at odds with not just Helmut Kohl, but also Erich Honecker from the outset. Kohl was pro re-unification, and along with Mitterrand wanted further European integration through the European Economic Community (EEC). [21] This was in stark contrast to Thatcher’s Euroscepticism and war time fear of Germany, which plagued the Conservative party in the 1980s. [22] There is evidence to suggest that these two clashing personalities were the main factor in the further deterioration of British and FRG relations. The British cabinet were well aware of this, and at a meeting in September 1986 prior to Kohls visit to the UK, ministers were instructed to ensure his speech in parliament was well attended, and emphasised the importance of the EEC and NATO which both states were members of. [23] Prior to the fall of the Berlin wall in November 1989, many in Britain and Germany still regarded re-unification as a distant, albeit closer dream. Thatcher, not the GDR had further damaged relations with the FRG by stating ‘We beat the Germans twice, and now they are back!’. [24] The GDR at the time was struggling with considerable internal unrest and economic stagnation, with its future looking bleak. It had no time or effort to go on a diplomatic offensive to disrupt Anglo-West German relations, especially as Thatcher seemed to be doing the work herself. The cracks behind the Iron curtain were beginning to emerge [25], and despite Thatcher’s opposition, both President Bush and Chancellor Kohl pushed with the re-unification. With Gorbachev’s Glasnost policy not opposing the re-unification, the GDR was now the primary focus of the FRG. [26] It is difficult not to advance the 1989 time frame set in this essay, but many opinions of the French and British eventually changed to support the re-unification in 1990, partly through the fear of shunning the new Germany, which was not to be a successor state, but a continuation of the FRG. [27] If that were to be the case, then Britain would have had poor relations with at least one form of Germany from as far back as 1933.

“We beat them twice, and now they’re back!”. Thatchers fear of a powerful united Germany tested her relationship with West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl

Overall, it is fair to say that the role the GDR played when considering British and FRG relations was severely limited. Britain had little interest in the GDR for much of its existence, a view supported by historian Martin Mccauley who states that ‘…Britain developed never any rapport with the GDR…there was a remarkable level of ignorance about the GDR amongst the British public’.[28] Due to the East Germans reclusive nature, and differing ideological perspectives, it was only natural that the UK would foster warmer relations with the FRG, especially as this was the territory they were occupying following the end of the war. The desire of some on the far left in the UK to improve relations with the GDR did anger the FRG. Britain’s official policy of adhering to the Hallstein Doctrine then Détente period was in line with that of the FRG and USA. It was only in the 1980s that the GDR had begun to deeply affect British and FRG relations. However, it is worth noting that it was less the actions of the GDR that affected this relationship, and more of what the FRG wanted to do in relation to re-unification with the GDR. Had the GDR been the main perpetrator of the re-unification process, then it could be argued their actions were the main proponent responsible for the worsening ties between London and Bonn. This was not the case, and it was as much the work of personality clashes between Thatcher and Kohl, than it was of the GDR and its MfAA DDR (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic).

[1] R. Spencer, Politics and Government in Germany, 1944-1994: Basic Documents, (Oxford, Berghahn Books, 1995), pp. 27-29.

[2] P. Quint, The Imperfect Union; Constitutional Structures for German Unification, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1991) p.14.

[3] The National Government Archives, ‘British Economics and Trade Union Politics 1973-1974’, [Online] Available at: https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/https://nationalarchives.gov.uk/releases/2005/nyo/politics.htm.

[4] D. McCullough, Truman, (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1992), pp. 547-549.

[5] J. Noakes, P. Wende, J. Wright, Britain and Germany in Europe 1949-1990, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002), p.31.

[6] P. Speiser, The British Army on the Rhine: Turning Nazi enemies into Cold War Partners, (University of Illinois Press, Chicago, 2016), p.79.

[7] The British Cartoon Archives, Victor Weisz, VY3018, Underneath the lantern by the barrack gate, Darling, I remember the way you used to wait, My own Lilli Marlene, my own Lilli Marlene, Date Unknown/Unpublished.

[8] NATO, ‘The United Kingdom and NATO’, [Online] Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_162351.htm.

[9] D. Lewis, The GDR: A background to East German Studies, (Blairgowrie, Lochee Publications, 1988), pp. 21-23.

[10] Noakes, op.cit., p.200.

[11] The National Archives [Abbreviated to TNA in subsequent footnotes], PREM 11/3806, Future of Germany Part 23, 13 September 1962.

[12] TNA, FO 371/169212 CG 1075/3, GDR Accession to Nuclear Test Treaty, 26 July 1963.

[13] Ibid, 1 August 1963.

[14] Ibid, CG 1075/8, Letter from Schröder to Home, 5 August 1963.

[15] TNA, FO 371/172132 RG 1071/8, Status of Berlin and GDR: Soviet partial measures proposals: East-West relations, 3 November 1963.  

[16] D. Childs, The Other Germany: Perceptions and Influences in British-East German Relations, 1945-1990, The English Historical Review, Volume CXXII, Issue 499, (2007), pp. 1470-1472.

[17] K. Schluenes, C. Bayley, ‘Economy: The East German System’, 8 January 2020, Encyclopaedia Britannica, [Online] Available at: https://www.britannica.com/place/Germany/The-East-German-system.  

[18] The Berlin Wall, ‘West Germanys Permanent mission in East Berlin’, [Online] Available at: https://www.the-berlin-wall.com/videos/west-germanys-permanent-mission-in-east-berlin-635/.

[19] S. Berger and N. LaPorte, Friendly Enemies: Britain and the GDR 1949-1990, (New York, Berghan Books , 2010), p.170.

[20] H. Manace, ‘Thatcher saw Soviets as allies against Germany’, Financial Times, 30th December 2016, [Online] Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/dd74c884-c6b1-11e6-9043-7e34c07b46ef.

[21] L. Ratti, ‘Not-So-Special Relationship: The US, The UK and German Unification’, 1945-1990, (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2017), pp. 206-209.

[22] L. Nutti, ‘The crisis of Détente in Europe: From Helsinki to Gorbachev 1975-1985’, (Abingdon, Routledge, 2008), p.104.

[23] TNA, CAB 128/83/31, ‘Conclusions of a meeting of the cabinet held at 10 Downing street’, 18 September 1986.

[24] Margaret Thatcher, ‘We beat the Germans twice!’, 8th December 1989, (Opening remarks at the European Community Summit, Strasbourg, France).

[25] Associated Press Archive, G28088903, ‘East German wave of Refugees seeking Asylum swells’, 24August 1989.

[26] S. Shane, ‘Dismantling Utopia: How information ended the Soviet Union’, (Chicago, I.R Dee, 1994), pp. 182-200.

[27] CVCE, ‘The Unification Treaty between the FRG and GDR’, 31 August 1990, pp. 3-4, [Online] Available at: https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1997/10/13/2c391661-db4e-42e5-84f7-bd86108c0b9c/publishable_en.pdf.

[28] M. H Duron, ‘Review ofFriendly Enemies: Britain and the GDR, 1949-1990’, German Politics & Society, Vol. 32, No. 4 (113), pp. 94-96.

Designed to fail? A judgement on the Structure of the League of Nations.

Delegates attending a League of Nations meeting, c. 1930. Central Press/Hulton Archives/Getty Images

It is too easy for contemporary historians to be misguided by hindsight and declare the League of Nations a failure. This is often supported by simply listing the failings of the league such as dealing with the Manchuria Crisis in 1931 and the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935.  However, it is important to look at the design of the league itself and evaluate whether these failings may have been preventable, or if the league was destined to fail from the beginning. Failure in this case will be considered as failing to prevent the outbreak of a major conflict. Whilst the league failed in this aspect, it was successful in many others, especially dealing with smaller disputes such over the Aaland islands or the creation of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). The inability for the world powers following the Great War to create a league that adopted the US approach of applying legalistic sanctions, accompanied with elements of the French proposals of a united armed force, would prove to hinder the league in the years to come. This is where the failure in its design lays. This work aims to explore the different proposals put forward for the league, and how many ideas were rejected. The inability to create a league supported by institutions with the ability to implement its decisions, rather than just recommend them will also be explored. Examples such as the Manchurian crisis and Italian invasion of Abyssinia will be used to support the view, that the league was designed to fail.

Conferences such as the Congress of Paris (1856) following the Crimean War, helped to enforce the ‘status quo’ amongst European powers. – RMN Grand-Palais

The League of Nations was not a brand-new concept that emerged after the horrors of the Great War. Indeed, almost a hundred years prior there had been attempts by European states to maintain peace and stability after the Napoleonic wars through the concert of Europe.[1] The League was to be the first physical organisation that was designed to maintain world peace. It was to provide an opportunity for nations to resolve their issues diplomatically and through converse, instead of resorting to military means. [2] However, the way in which these aims were to be achieved were not all agreed upon. The French, British and United States of America all had different opinions and views into the way the League should operate. It would be the failure to adopt the US approach of physically enforcing sanctions that resulted in it becoming a toothless tiger that was designed to fail. Whilst there was a consensus amongst the founding states, that the league should encompass in upholding the laws and conventions created prior to the war, such as the Geneva Conventions and Hague Conventions, the methods in which to do this proved troublesome. [3] Evidence of this can be seen following the Phillimore committee. The British government agreed with the idea that there should be a ‘Conference of Allied States” that would arbitrate disputes and impose sanctions on offending states’[4].

The United States wanted to develop this idea further and enforce these sanctions by ‘blockading and closing the frontiers of a power to commerce or intercourse with any part of the world and to use any force that may be necessary’.[5]  Failure to adopt this full measure would come back to haunt the British during the Italian invasion Abyssinia in 1935. Had the league agreed to enforce a full and comprehensive range of oil and tanker restrictions on Italy by force, it would have compelled the state to deplete its gold reserves by buying oil at an inflated price, and severely limit its ability to wage war. [6] Without wondering too much into the ‘what if’ scenarios, this action would have exposed Italy’s dire oil situation and would have been a significant factor when Mussolini considered joining the Second World War four years later. Even prior to this, the covenant was already being subverted by Italy despite Article 1 stating ‘Any fully self-governing State, Dominion or Colony not named in the Annex may become a Member of the League’[7], the British were being coerced into discouraging Abyssinia from joining by the Italians. Lord Cecil ‘had received instructions to oppose the admission of Abyssinia’ and to then ‘put them in an envelope containing other material of a less important nature’.[8] These actions show that as early as 1923, the very structure of the league of nations was beginning to show flaws in its design. By failing to address these issues early, the League is already setting a precedent for it to fail in the future.

Italian attitudes towards Abyssinia would become apparent years later. – DAILY NEWS, New York City, October 3, 1935 .

However, it is worth giving attention to the counter argument that the League itself was not designed to fail, but rather it was the actions of imperialistic and expansionist powers in the 1930s that caused its ultimate demise. The League managed to settle the dispute between Finland and Sweden over the sovereignty of the Aaland islands. This was accomplished by the League granting the islands political and cultural autonomy whilst legally remaining a part of Finland. [9] The League of Nations had proved itself to be capable of achieving its main goal of averting war and providing an opportunity for states to solve issues diplomatically. It would be unfair to call the design of the league a complete failure, when in its very first international crisis it was able to deal with it in a matter that satisfied all parties involved. [10]

The Finnish Civil War and their dissociation from Bolshevik Russia led to the Aaland Island dispute with Sweden proved to be the first major challenge for the League – The Finnish Civil War 1918, Ikkala.

To emphasise just how effective the league was in dealing with this issue, you only need to look fifteen years prior to the first Morocco Crisis. An aggravating dispute over French and German control over Morocco very nearly spilled into an armed conflict in 1905, with both nations initially refusing to attend a conference with other world powers to settle the issue. The German Chancellor Count Bernhard von Bülow went as far as to threaten war over the crisis.[11] Whilst the Algeciras Conference did resolve the issue, it showed that diplomacy can still be used even when hope seems lost in order to avoid conflict. However, had a institution such as the league of nations existed, in which the states had an equal opportunity to voice their concerns, then there is every chance a long lasting international resolution could have been made, that may have avoided the Second Morocco Crisis.[12] The Leagues design went far beyond just offering diplomatic solutions and being a reactionary force. It was proactive in encouraging a universal improvement in living standards, to provide one less reason for people to go to war in the first place. Nowhere is this more evident than in the creation of the International Labour Organisation, one of the few institutions created within the League of Nations to still survive today. [13] The organisation saw much success in implementing what it was designed to do, improve the lives of people around the world through adopting the likes of a maximum eight hour working day and granting six weeks maternity leave, including benefits and pay to mothers.[14] It would be unfair to say that this was designed to fail, when to the contrary its design had proved to be so successful that even a hundred years later its decisions are still being implemented and respected throughout the world. Whilst this may be hailed as a success, when compared to the previous definition of what constitutes a ‘failure’ for the league; the ability to prevent war, then the International Labour Organisation did not go far enough. This is evident by the fact that despite its implementation, wars have still been fought between 1919 to 1946, including by league members such as Poland in the Polish-Soviet war 1919-1920,[15] and Spain in the Spanish Civil War 1936-1939.[16] The ILO was not designed in a way to physically prevent these wars, and thus can be argued was designed in a way that led to the League being a failure.

Could the actions of the Kaiser have been curtailed prior to the Great War? States have been able to avoid war without the help of international organisations before.

Despite all the factors previously mentioned, one of the biggest design flaws in the League of Nations was the failure to get the United states to adopt Article X of the covenant, and the failure by other League members to uphold it. The article would have bound the US to respond militarily to assist another member should they be attacked, thus forcing America into a war they may not wish to be part of. This was in great contrast with the isolationist mentality prevalent in the US at the time.[17] Lacking the support of such a major international power, the United Kingdom and France, both still reeling from the effects of the First World War, were reluctant to play the role of the worlds policemen. Only on one occasion in which Article X was enacted did the League act successfully, and this was with the Greco-Bulgarian conflict in 1925, in which Bulgaria appealed under Article X to the league. A session of the council was called and ‘Under the observation of the British, French and Italian military attachés, the hostilities ceased, and the evacuation of the territory occupied by Greek forces was carried out without incident.’[18] However, this success would be its last.

The League failed to uphold the Article on numerous occasions, including during the Manchurian Crisis in 1932. Following Japans invasion and occupation of Manchuria, China appealed to the League. Its response was slow and cautious, with Britain and France as well as other members in no position to wage war against Japan in defence of China. Britain could go as far as to offer ‘moral condemnation’ and was in no position to respond to Japanese aggression, especially financially, as they had just recently come off the Gold Standard. [19] Following a long delay, the Lytton report placed blame on the Mukden Incident on Japan and ordered them withdraw from China [20]. Japan disagreed with the report’s decision, kept its forces in the newly created puppet state of Manchukuo, and simply withdrew from the League in March 1933. [21] This incident exposed the utter failure of the League of Nations to adhere to its own covenant. Failure to follow its own principles and rules by not fully adhering to Article X meant that the league was already designed to fail. If states were not willing to follow the Covenant, then they should have designed it differently to ensure that they would. This is where it is linked back to the legalistic sanctionist approach that William Taft had proposed earlier. Had this approach been encompassed into the leagues design, then it would have provided other opportunities for punitive action to take place against violations of the Covenant. The same could be applied to the French proposals of a united armed force, which may have helped lift the burden of responsibility on the Great War victors to uphold the covenant. This would have required all member states contribute to its upkeep in physically resisting Japan and defending Chinas sovereignty. This could have been implemented had Article XVI been adhered to by the League. [22]

The Empire of Japan fabricated her claims for a Casus Belli in Manchuria. When the Lytton Commission condemned the actions and demanded their withdrawal, Japan simply withdrew from the League. – Japanese troops bayonet a dead ROC soldier during the Jiangqiao Campaign, 1931.

In conclusion, it is an accurate judgement to state the League of Nations was designed to fail. The organisation itself had created a covenant that was too ambitious and was primarily dominated by a mentality that all members would conform and follow the rules just as the likes of Britain would, through fear of a repeat of the First World War. [23] It failed to evolve into an organisation that might have included the United States as a member, primarily through maintaining Articles X and XVI which the US congress would not pass. The League also allowed itself to be subverted and essentially pushed around by the likes of Italy and Japan when decisions did not go their own way. By failing to address flaws in its design, such as indecision caused through the majority voting essentially giving powerful states vetoes it created a ‘league of victors’[24] (those victorious from the Great War having the most say in the league). The League was crippled by its indecision and its inability for reform caused it to try and save face rather than attempt to stop war. This is a weakness that Adolf Hitler would exploit throughout the 1930s, with the League aware of its failure in dealing with Japan in 1932, it would not try again in defending Czechoslovakia from German demands in 1938. This proves that even the League itself was aware of the failure in its design, knowing that it could not assist the Czechs, who had been a member since the beginning [25].

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[1] Randall Lessafer ‘The Congress of Vienna 1815-1815’, 9th February 2015, Oxford Public International Law, [Online] Available at: https://opil.ouplaw.com/page/congress-vienna-1814-1815.

[2] C. Tomuscaht, The United Nations at Age Fifty: A Legal Prospective, (Hauge, Martinus Nijohff Publishers, 1995), p. 77.

[3] F.S. Northedge, The League of Nations: Its life and time 1920-1946, (USA, Holmes & Meier, 1986), p. 10.

[4] Karj J Schmidt, ‘The League of Nations’, 1994, American History from Revolution to Reconstruction and beyond, [Online] Available at: http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/essays/1901-/the-league-of-nations-karl-j-schmidt.php.

[5] A. Zimmern, The League of Nations and the Rule of Law 1918-1935, (London, Macmillan, 1936), pp. 14-21.

[6] G.B Strang, ‘The worst of all Worlds: Oil Sanctions and Italy’s Invasion of Abyssinia 1935-1936’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 19 (2008), pp. 210-235.

[7] Yale Law School, ‘Covenant of the League of Nations’, [Online] Available at: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp.

[8] The National Archives [Abbreviated to TNA in subsequent footnotes], FO 371/8410, Abyssinia Code 1 Files 5097 (papers 5519 – end) 7391, 1923.

[9] M.W Mikesell and A.B Murphy, ‘A Framework for Comparative Study of Minority-Group Aspirations’, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 81 Issue. 4 (1991), p. 597.

[10] Northedge, op.cit., pp. 77-78.

[11] R.K Massie, Dreadnought: Britain, Germany and the coming of the Great War, (London, Random House, 1991), pp. 27-31.

[12] M. Soroka, Britain, Russia and the road to the First World War, (Farnham, Ashgate Publishing, 2011), p.114.

[13] International Labour Organisation, ‘How the ILO works’, [Online] Available at: https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/how-the-ilo-works/lang–en/index.htm.

[14] International Labour Organisation, ‘History of the ILO’, [Online] Available at: https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/history/lang–en/index.htm.

[15] N.R Davies, White Eagle, Red Star: The Polish Soviet War 1919-1920, (New York, Random House, 2003), p.39.

[16] A. Beevor, The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War 1936-1939, (London, Penguin Publishing Books, 2006), p. 43.

[17] The Khan Academy, ‘The League of Nations’, [Online] Available at: https://www.khanacademy.org/humanities/us-history/rise-to-world-power/us-in-wwi/a/the-league-of-nations.

[18] UNOG Library, ‘Registry, Records and Archives Unit History of the League of Nations (1919-1946)’, [Online] Available at: https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/36BC4F83BD9E4443C1257AF3004FC0AE/%24file/Historical_overview_of_the_League_of_Nations.pdf.

[19] A.J.P Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, (New York, Atheneum, 1962), p. 92.

[20] UNOG Library, op.cit.

[21] L.A Horvitz and C. Catherwood, Encyclopedia of War Crimes and Genocide, (New York, Facts on File Publishing, 2011), p. 128.

[22] Yale Law School, op.cit., Article XVI (16).

[23] C. Barnett, The Collapse of British Power, (London, Pan, 2002), pp. 424-426.

[24] G. Gorodetsky, Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1991: A Retrospective, (London, Routledge, 1994), p. 1.

[25] J. Wallenfeldt, ‘League of Nations’, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 3rd March 2020, [Online] Available at: https://www.britannica.com/topic/League-of-Nations/Members-of-the-League-of-Nations.

The Middle East as a place of Violence and Killing?

US Troops advance pass a burning Oil Well during the 2003 Invasion of Iraq – Arlo.K/U.S Navy

For much of its history, the Middle East has been viewed as a backwards and violent place by many in the West, especially when compared to the likes of Europe and North America. During its control by the Ottoman Empire, it was perceived as an extension to the ‘sick man of Europe’[1]. The West had noticed and exploited the regions instability as far back as 1916 with the likes of the Arab Revolt relying on distrust amongst its citizens based on religious and cultural lines such as Sunni and Shia Muslims[2]. These views have been reinforced since the turn of century, especially after the West had experienced countless terror attacks including bombings of the London Underground on 7th July 2005 and the hijackings of airliners in America on 11th September 2001. With these terrorists committing acts in the name of radical Islam and originating primarily from the Middle East, the Wests views on the region have been distorted based upon the actions of a few. This has resulted in a generalisation of the region, as well as of Muslims as a whole[3]. Not to mention the countless wars including the 2003 Invasion of Iraq, the Gaza Strip conflicts and since 2011 the ongoing Syrian Civil war. Which are constantly dominating the media, it’s hard for the average person to not view the region as one huge warzone.

One of the main reasons the Middle East has been viewed as a place of violence and killing is due to the nature of terror attacks that occur in Europe and the USA. In September 2018 the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) published its annual review of Terrorism for the year 2017. It stated that victims of Terrorist attacks increased in the United Kingdom by ‘+356%, from nine people killed in 2016 to 41 people killed in 2017’ as well as in France with a +59% increase[4]. The report also stated that the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS or just IS) an Islamic extremist terrorist group was responsible for the most attacks in 2017[5].These attacks have meant that many people associate Islam with terrorism, after all the current most notable group has the name ‘Islamic’ in it (IS). The association is then made with the term Muslim and where they come from, which is primarily the Middle East. Terror attacks can drastically change a nations outlook on certain religions or people, and nowhere was this more evident than after the worst terror attack in modern history, 9/11. These attacks, resulting in just under 3000 deaths, included 67 Britons[6], 24 Canadians[7] and 10 Italians[8] as well as many other nationalities. As a result, hate crimes against Muslims increased rapidly, with hatred based not on an individual’s actions, but on where they come from or what religion they follow[9], as there was no specific state to blame or take action against. These attacks are hard for a nation to forget and are usually an easy go to for xenophobes or racists to blame their issues upon. This fear of terrorists and terrorism means people are less likely to visit the Middle East for naïve reasons such as ‘they might get blown up’ as it is seen as the origin of many terror organisations[10]. The political consequences of this result in less investment and tourism, which can severely hinder Middle Eastern countries economies, which lack modern industrialisation and technology and rely heavily on oil exports[11]. This in turn can have a ripple effect, as the lack of investment in a country because of terror risks, means the country in question has less money to invest in their security forces to try and combat the terror risk in the first place. In other instances, the risk of terror does not even exist. For example, prior to the Arab spring in 2011, Syria was a stable albeit authoritarian country[12], yet uneducated individuals would consider it to have been in the same state as Iraq or Afghanistan.

Terror attacks in the West, like the 2005 London Bombings are often blamed on individuals from the Middle East – AFP/Getty Images

Another reason the West sees the Middle East as place full of violence and killing, is due to the number of wars that have taken place there over the last 25 years. In Europe, the last major conflict was with the breakup of Yugoslavia in the late 1990’s, which had been considered the first ‘war’ on European soil since the end of WWII in 1945[13]. There has been around 15 years of peace before the current crisis in Ukraine unfolded in 2014. Meanwhile the Middle East has had countless conflicts, including the 2003 Invasion of Iraq, 2011 Syrian Civil War, First Gulf War, Invasion of Afghanistan and numerous smaller Gaza wars of 2008/09, 2012 and 2014, all resulting in far more casualties and deaths[14]. Such a bounty of state conflicts, something which is virtually unheard of in Europe anymore, has had a severe impact on the region internationally. To start with, these conflicts often result in other states evacuating their embassies and informing their citizens not to travel to the affected country [15][16][17]. These actions can cause a state to become isolated on the international stage, and the lack of diplomatic and consular support for foreign nationals further hinders the Middle Eastern states relations. Western leaders have also helped to portray the Middle East in a negative light, with two states being described as part of a ‘Axis of Evil’ Iraq and Iran[18]. Whenever the Middle East is discussed in Western parliaments or governments, it is usually to a prelude of war, as was the case in the 2014 British parliament vote on airstrikes against ISIS in Syria. The speeches made by MP’s to try and gain support for their proposition, often focus on the suffering these citizens are experiencing, further exaggerating our views of the region as violent and a place of killing[19].  

Lastly, the role of religion in the Middle East has had a significant contribution in portraying the region as violent. Much of the area, apart from Israel, follows some form of Sharia law[20]. For Western secular democracies based on Christian values, such a link between the state and religion is viewed negatively. The violent parts of sharia law such as the death penalty for apostasy or cutting of hands for theft[21], are often the only aspects that non-Muslims are aware of. Despite the fact it is not fully enforced across the region and varies in its severity, it still acts as a deterrent to certain groups. Marginalised groups in society such as members of the LGBT+ community, Christians and Atheists would be hesitant to immigrate to such countries that hinder their own personal freedoms. There are genuine fears for their safety, especially as a lack of stable governments due to the reasons previously mentioned can result in vigilante justice prevailing in countries that have legalised homosexual acts for example, such as Iraq in 2003[22]. Such persecution of minorities, often resulting in violence and in some cases death, can have dire political consequences. Global institutions such as the UN can put pressure on these countries to improve their human rights records or face the risk of sanctions[23]. Such poor Human Rights records in the Middle East accompanied with what the West believes are backwards and outdated laws, show the region to be almost barbaric and living in the past. The common attribute prescribed to barbarians are of course violent individuals. This does of course raise the question about whether the West is right to criticise the rulings of other countries. Many in the Middle East may ask what makes the Wests style of government and society the ‘correct’ way to run a country? Many classical realists may adopt the approach that a state sovereignty is supreme over any NGO or international body.

Protests such as these often stir up hatred of Islam, and depict Muslim countries as backwards – Phillip Holles

This is based primarily of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 which argues that a state has the right to do as they please within their own borders[24]. Despite this justification for how states may act in the Middle East, the fact remains that the region still harbours terrorists, is rife with wars and instability and poses a risk to life for many minorities who would otherwise be well protected in the West.In conclusion, the main reasons the West define the Middle East as a place of violence and killing is due to the prevalence of terrorism in the region, as well as being where many terrorists who attack Europe train or originate from[25]. This is accompanied by the high number of wars prevalent, and the instability of governments, resulting in failure to uphold human rights. The political consequences of this fall into two main areas. Firstly, the population of Western powers are less likely to invest or visit the Middle East due to the fear of attacks, which in turn results in Middle Eastern states not being able to improve their economies. Improved economies can result in better living conditions of Middle Easterners, including better education which in turn could help deter many people from terrorism or violence and peruse more peaceful means to achieve their aims or goals. Secondly, the perceived aggressive mannerisms from these states[26] can result in them becoming isolated on the world stage. This in turn can result in them taking more aggressive foreign diplomacy actions to still be viewed as great powers. Thus, making them appear more violent

[1] M. Reynolds (2011), ’Shattering Empires: The clash and collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires 1908-1918’, Cambridge University press, Cambridge, UK, pp. 1-3. 

[2] E. Tauber (2014), ‘The Arab Movements in World War I’, Routledge, New York, USA, pp. 80-81.

[3] R. Hardy (2010), ‘The Guardian: Islamism why the west gets it wrong’, [Online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2010/mar/16/islamism-west-muslim-brotherhood.  

[4] National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, ‘Annex of Statistical Information Country Reports on Terrorism 2017’, September 2018 [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/283097.pdf, pp.1-7.  

[5] Ibid, p.3.

[6] S. Atkins (2011), ‘The 9/11 Encyclopaedia’, Santa Barba, California, USA, p.248.

[7] ibid

[8] N. Aldern (2011), ‘Italy Magazine: Remembering the Italian victims of 9/11’, [Online] Available at: https://www.italymagazine.com/featured-story/remembering-italian-victims-911.

[9] CNN (2001), ‘Hate crimes reports up in wake of terrorist attacks’, [Online] Available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20051127025019/http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/16/gen.hate.crimes/. [Archived].

[10] T. Regan (2018), ‘The Arab Weekly: Tourism growth a ‘mixed blessing’ for some countries in the Middle East’, [Online] Available at: https://thearabweekly.com/tourism-growth-mixed-blessing-some-countries-middle-east.

[11] G. Abed and H. Davoodi (2003), ‘IMF: Challenges of Growth and Modernisation in the Middle East and North Africa’, [Online] Available at: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/med/2003/eng/abed.htm.

[12] M. Weiss and H. Hassan (2016), ‘ISIS Inside the army of terror’, Regan Arts, New York, USA. Pp. 97-103.

[13] A. Williams (2016), ‘New Statesmen: How valid is the claim that the EU has delivered peace in Europe?’, [Online] Available at: https://www.newstatesman.com/world/2016/05/how-valid-claim-eu-has-delivered-peace-europe.

[14] R. Fawn and R. Hnnebusch (2006), ‘The Iraq War: Causes and consequences’, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, England, p.15.

[15] UK Government (2019), ‘Foreign Office: Syria travel advice’, [Online] Available at: https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/syria.

[16] UK Government (2019), ‘Foreign Office: Iraq travel advice’, [Online] Available at: https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/iraq.

[17] UK Government (2019), ‘Foreign office: Terrorism risk to British and Dual nationals in Iran’, [Online] Available at: https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/iran/terrorism

[18] George W. Bush (2002), ‘State of the Union address’, [Online] Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=btkJhAM7hZw.

[19] Hillary Benn (2015), ‘Address to Parliament on the vote of Airstrikes in Syria against ISIL’, [Online] Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n2GTNK4VsXs and transcript at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmhansrd/cm151202/debtext/151202-0001.htm#15120254000002.

[20] A. Puddington (2013), ‘Freedom House: Freedom in the world 2013’, [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FIW%202013%20Booklet%20-%20for%20Web.pdf.

[21] B. Lewis (2009),’ The Middle East: A brief history of the past 2000 years’, Simon and Schuster, New York, USA, p.229.  

[22] The Week (2019), ‘The countries around the world where homosexuality is still illegal’,[Online] Available at: https://www.theweek.co.uk/96298/the-countries-where-homosexuality-is-still-illegal.

[23] UNHR Office of High Commissioner (2019), ‘United Nations Human Rights for Middle East and North Africa’, [Online] Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/MENARegion/Pages/MENAProgramme.aspx.

[24] The Watchtower (2004), ‘The Peace of Westphalia – A Turning Point in Europe’, [Online] Available at: https://wol.jw.org/en/wol/d/r1/lp-e/2004205#h=1. 

[25] M. Weiss and H. Hassan, Op.cit, pp.52-58.

[26] B. Rubin (2006), ‘The long war for Freedom: The Arab struggle for Democracy in the Middle East’, John Wiley and Sons, New Jersey, USA, p.81.

Identity in relation to the concepts of Democracy and Sovereignty

Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith identified himself as African, but to his opposition he was an outsider

Identities shape the way we see the world and influence our daily lives. Individuals may formulate identities based upon religion, sexual orientation, race, gender, wealth or even country or origin. The way in which people identify, can prove to be troublesome when trying to engage democracy based upon a populace or in maintaining the premises of state sovereignty. This essay aims to explore why democracy is applied differently to alternative identities, notably the variences in how black and white people engage politically, such as through voting or party memberships. It also aspires to explain the difficulties in applying the western concept of democracy, onto those who identify as Muslim, and the implications it holds. This includes whether Islam is compatible with democratic principles such as individual rights.  The essay will then progress to investigate how identity influences the functioning of a state, in exercising its ability to govern, as defined by the Westphalian state system. The situation of those who identify as being Kurdish will be examined, especially based on their identity, which is not internationally recognised has sadly resulted in many deaths, all in the name of a state defending its sovereign borders from terrorism. It will cover the ability a state possess to ensure its continuation as an existing entity, and how repressive activities can force people to try and disassociate with how they identify, as is the case with the Turkish invasion of Syria, in the name of counter-terrorism.  

The modern concept of democracy is best defined by Abraham Lincoln, during his Gettysburg address, in which he stated that it is ‘a government of the people, by the people, for the people’.[1] However, this definition is often not applied equally to the whole population. Those who may be in a minority group, such as black people, struggle to achieve the same levels of engagement in the democratic process, as compared to the likes of white people. This can be seen in the post-colonial state of Rhodesia, the predecessor to modern day Zimbabwe. Those who identified as Non-European, which was 96.28% of the population[2], were only able to elect 8 Members of Parliament. Meanwhile the white minority were able to elect 50 members.[3] As Rhodesia was a post-colonial state, it inherited the mentality from its previous colonial overlord, the United Kingdom. During the colonial period, de-humanisation was used as an excuse to bring about civilisation to the dark places of Africa. The local population were treated as inferior, and this mentality was as dominant with the Rhodesian government as it was with the British.[4]

Cecil Rhodes, the master puppeteer of Africa? – BBC/Alamy

By only electing 8 black MPs, Rhodesia was failing to democratically represent the majority of its population who identified as Black, and Non-European. Failure to do so holds back the local populace in gaining the ability to adequately represent themselves. The white western colonial culture influenced the political behaviour of the Rhodesians, which in turn led to antagonism with an ‘us vs them’ mentality, in this case white vs black. Evidence demonstrates that refusing to apply the democratic rights of a representative democracy to those who identify differently, has disastrous consequences. This can be observed in the first elections in which the black Rhodesian population were given the equal franchise. The black population voted overwhelmingly to remove the white minority government, and instead elected those who they best identified with, in this case Robert Mugabe’s black nationalist ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe African National-Union Patriotic Front).[5] For a representative democracy to truly adhere to Abraham Lincolns definition, it needs to encompass the representation of all, or at least a majority of identities within their borders if they are to succeed. [6] The change in Rhodesia was significant after the minority, who were indeed the actual majority, were finally allowed to have their voices heard.[7]

Another identity of vital importance when examining the concept of democracy, is those who identify as Muslim. Indeed, some Muslim clerics such as Kadhem al-Evadi al-Nasseri have argued that “…The West wants to distract you with shiny slogans like freedom, democracy, culture and civil society”.[8] Khaled Abou El Fadl also puts forward the point that the third, and best system of democracy would be ‘the caliphate based on Shari’ah law’.[9] This in turn argues that Islamic law triumphs over any other legal system, including secular institutions. The concept of modern democracy follows a Eurocentric and Western approach, which prioritises individualistic rights, as based on the United Nations Human Rights Charter (UNHRC).[10] This proves difficult for those who identify as Muslim, for their basic refence is the Koran, whilst for democracy it is the UNHRC. One aims to promote the freedom of thought, whilst interpretations of ta’a, or ‘obedience’ often condemn it.[11]Islam is a diverse religion, and whilst someone may identify as Muslim, it can be dissected even further, such as categorisation through Sunni or Shia Muslims, much like Christianity has Protestantism, Mormonism, Anglicanism, Catholicism and many other denominations. So, whilst the teachings of Islamic scholars should be considered when covering the link between democracy and those who identify as Muslim, great care should be taken not to tarnish all Muslims with the same brush. The rights of individuals to be decided by institutions or laws in Islamic countries are often placed second when in comparison to the word of God. Indeed, it is argued ‘…the absolute sovereignty of God makes any human hierarchy impossible, since before God all humans are equal’.[12][13] It is not just Muslim scholars who believe that those who identify as Muslim cannot co-exist amongst democratic principles. The clash of tradition against modernity is a feature of post-colonial politics and is backed up by Huntington’s theory on the Clash of Civilisations. The theory states that along the fault lines dividing Europe and the Middle East, the traditional Muslim civilisation clash with the opposing views of a supposedly modern Western Christian civilisation.[14]  The West, notably France have sought to discourage those who identify as Muslim, from engaging in democratic procedures, such as voting or attending public meetings. It is illegal to cover one’s face with a burqa, the traditional Islamic garment, in public.[15] In doing so, this prevents Muslims from engaging in the democratic process, as they risk punishment for expressing their identity in public, and ergo this would penalise them if they were to vote whilst wearing it.

The events of September 11th has shaped public opinion into thinking ‘all’ Muslims harbour these sentiments towards the West, freedom and Democracy – NIST

Those who identify as Kurdish essentially stick a spanner into the works of the functioning of state sovereignty. Kurdistan encompasses many of the factors which make up a traditional state. It has a flag, anthem, leader, military and a rough geographical area.[16] This area covers Northern Syria and Iraq, North-Western Iran and South East of Turkey[17], which in turn is where the issues arise. Identity is largely ignored, due to the Eurocentric Westphalian state system, which proves the basis for all recognised states in the world today, as based on the Peace Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.[18] Imperialism made this system the universal norm, and borders rarely change without violence, as Leon Trotsky stated ‘every state is founded on force’.[19] Kurdistan never formalised into an internationally recognised country, even though they have been close, as with the Treaty of Sèvres after World War One. This would have granted the Kurds a referendum on independence after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.[20] As this identity of a Kurd doesn’t fall into the western narrative of a nation state, it allows other recognised states to choose their own label for the Kurdish identity. Nowhere is this more prevalent than Turkey, who deems the Kurds to be terrorists and a threat to the very existence of the Turkish state.[21] This consequently provides a casus belli for Turkey to persecute, torture and invade the Kurds, in the name of counter-terrorism.[22] Turkey is fighting over an imaginary line and territorial boundary that was not even decided by them, but by the French, Italians and British colonial powers in 1920.[23] Bhikhu Parekh places identity into three main dimensions; personal identity based on physical attributes and self-consciousness. Social identity based upon ethnic, religious or cultural groups. Then overall identity, meaning  belonging to the human species.[24] It is Turkey who is trying to eradicate the social identity of the Kurds to maintain the sovereignty of their state. This concept isn’t exclusive to the Middle East, indeed the Catholics in Northern Ireland and Catalonians in Spain have, to a lesser extent had attempts to diminish the prevalence of their social identity, to ensure the survival of the larger and internationally recognised state.

Kurdistan lacks the protections a sovereign state offers – Library of Congress/DC

In conclusion, it has been clearly demonstrated that identity plays a significant role, via influencing the workings of democracy and, through maintaining state sovereignty in politics and international relations. It would be naïve to state that there is a single form of democracy that could best represent the thousands of different identities found within a single country. Instead, the most common identities are often prioritised instead. Since the majority of traditional de-colonisation has ended, an example being the end of the British Empire in 1997 with the handover of Hong Kong,[25] the West has begun to recognise and administer further rights to minorities that were previously ignored. This is evident in the advancement of LGBT+ rights through the introduction of same sex marriage in 2015.[26] The concept for sovereignty however has not altered greatly in the last 371 years, except through the likes of pooled sovereignty, with global and regional institutions such as the UN or European Union. Identity in regard to sovereignty lies primarily with nationality, an identity that isn’t changeable for many who can’t afford to emigrate. Nationality and sovereignty can often be a predecessor for genocide and displacement, as previously mentioned regarding the current situation in Northern Syria with Turkey and the Kurds. Identities within politics and international relations are either recognised and defended, or persecuted and destroyed, and so it is vital they are protected and upheld.

[1] History Today (2010), ‘The Gettysburg Address’, [Online] Available at: https://www.history.com/topics/american-civil-war/gettysburg-address.

[2] J. Paxton (1971), ‘The Statesman’s yearbook 1971-1972: The Businessman’s Encyclopaedia of all nations’, 108th Edition, Springer Nature, London, p.522.

[3] R.C Good (2015), ‘UDI: The International Politics of the Rhodesian Rebellion’, Princeton University Press, USA, p.304.

[4] I. Smith (1997), ‘The Great Betrayal: Memoirs of Ian Douglas Smith Africa’s most controversial leader’, Blake Publishing, London, UK, p.4.

[5] J. Boynton (1980), ‘Election Commissioner: Independence elections Southern Rhodesia’, [Online] Available at: https://heinonline-org.ezproxy.westminster.ac.uk/HOL/Page?handle=hein.cow/sourhode0001&id=1&collection=cow&index=cow/sourhode.   

[6] S. Smooha (2002), ‘The model of ethnic democracy: Israel as a Jewish and democratic state’ Nations and Nationalism’, Jewish Law Association, Israel, p.475.

[7] G. Boynton (2007), ‘Smith has sadly been proved right’, The Telegraph [Online] Available at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/3644217/Ian-Smith-has-sadly-been-proved-right.html.

[8] S. Sachs (2003), ‘Shiite clerics ambitions collide in an Iraqi Slum’, The New York Times, p.18.

[9] K. Abou El Fadl (2004), ‘Islam and the Challenge of Democracy’, Princeton University Press, Oxfordshire, UK, p.3.

[10] United nations (1948), ’The Universal Declaration of Human Rights’, Article 21, [Online] Available at: https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/.

[11] F. Mernissi (1992), ‘Islam and Democracy’, Perseus Book Group, New York, USA, pp.60-61.

[12] J.L Esposito (1996), ‘Islam and Democracy’, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, p.25.

[13] T. Mastinak (1994), ‘Islam and the Creation of European Identity’, University of Westminster Press, London, UK, pp.31-34.

[14] S.P Huntington (1996), ‘The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order’, Simon & Schuster Publishing, New York, USA, p.21.

[15] S. Vandoorne (2010), ‘French Senate approves Burqa ban’, [Online] Available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/09/14/france.burqa.ban/?hpt=T1.

[16] M. T. O’Shea (2004), ‘Trapped between the map and reality: geography and perceptions of Kurdistan’, Routledge, London, UK, p.258.

[17] J. Ciment (1997), ‘The Kurds: State and Minority in Turkey, Iraq and Iran’, Facts on File Inc, New York, USA, p.2.

[18] The Watchtower (2004), ‘The Peace of Westphalia – A Turning Point in Europe’, [Online] Available at: https://wol.jw.org/en/wol/d/r1/lp-e/2004205#h=1. 

[19] W. Connolly (1984), ‘Legitimacy and the State’, Basil Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, UK, p.33.  

[20] H. Özoğlu (2004), ‘Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State: Evolving Identities, Competing Loyalties, and Shifting Boundaries’, SUNY Press, p.38.

[21] BBC (2019), ‘Turkey vs Syria’s Kurds: The Short, Medium and Long Story’, [Online] Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-49963649.

[22] Haaretz (2019), ‘Kurdish Politician among nine civilians executed by Turkish-backed fighters in Syria’, [Online] Available at: https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/syria/kurdish-politician-executed-by-turkish-backed-fighters-in-syria-1.7970427.

[23] K. Gupta & S. Sinha (1998), ‘Treaty of Sèvres’, [Online] Available at: https://www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-of-Sevres.

[24] B. Parekh (2008), ‘A New Politics of Identity: Political Principles for an Interdependent World’, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, Hampshire, pp.9-10.

[25] J. Darwin (2003), ‘Britain, The Commonwealth and the End of Empire’, [Online] Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/modern/endofempire_overview_01.shtml.

[26] UK Government (2013), ‘Same sex marriage becomes law’, [Online] Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/same-sex-marriage-becomes-law.

The Polish/German borderland and the effects the EU’s Eastward expansion has had on the perceived nature of borders as lines of divisions and contestations

The following work was submitted to the University of Westminster in December 2017.

The flag of the European Union. A symbol of hope to some, and aggression to others – Europa.Eu

The Oxford English Dictionary describes borders as; ‘a line separating two countries or other areas’[1]. However, history has shown us that a border is by far a lot more than just a simple ‘line’. Borders do not only define the geography of a state, but also its contents. Within these states lie specific entities, each rich with its own unique history, culture, and traditions, but also with common purposes and interests amongst its neighbours. The idea of sovereignty, a power these states poses was defined following the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, in which international territorial integrity would be maintained by a state. The state itself has ultimate power within its own borders, and can act as they please, so long as they do not violate their neighbours right to do the same [2]. This concept has now been challenged, following the creation of the European Union (EU). Originally a trading area known as the European Coal and Steel Community, throughout the cold war the organisation grew considerably. Following the treaties of Rome, Nice, Maastricht, and Lisbon, the EU began to expand beyond its original creation, becoming a political and economic union, with integration as one of its key principles [3]. With the 2004 enlargement, and the joining of the former communist Eastern Bloc nations, the EU now saw itself closer than ever to its biggest obstacle, a potential border with the Russian Federation. This eastward expansion comes with numerous benefits but also implications, and has led to questions such as the relevance of borders in a globalised world, the practicability of so called hard borders and the challenge of a line ‘separating’ two countries.  

The Eastward expansion visualised, note the lack of buffer states between Russia and Western Europe – Eurostat

To fully understand the EU’s policy of eastward expansion, you must first understand sovereignty, and its relation to borders. For some, a border represents a state almost as much as their own government, head of state or symbolic landmarks do. Borders have different meanings to different people, and for oneself personally, the crossing of a frontier whether it be through a border gate, or simply walking over a bridge, truly shows that one is another country. The crossing of the symbolic ‘line’ means you have entered a new state, with different laws, cultural expectations, and culture. Sir Hensley, author of the book ‘Sovereignty’ notes that ‘…the sovereignty of a state in theory is a necessary condition of its membership of the international system in practice’[4]. This means that, when a state gives up part of its sovereignty, in this case pooled sovereignty to the EU in terms of border controls, that they are giving up part of their place on the international stage. It is a factor which many conservatives and nationalists rely upon countless times in debate, when it comes to the criticism of open borders and immigration.

The policy of any right-wing party in Europe, whether it be the United Kingdom Independence Party, Front National in France or Alterntative für Deutschland in Germany, all argue for control over their borders with an anti-immigrant rhetoric [5]. With this perspective now considered, it is now easier to understand why there was initial opposition to the eastward expansion and its potential effects on border lines. Polish-Germanic relations were incredibly poor during the 20th century. Following the collapse of the Russian Empire after World War One, Poland became independent. Soon after, with the National Socialists gaining power in Germany in 1933, the relations soured even more. Hitler wanted Lebensraum (living space) for the German people, and looked eastwards towards Poland to gain it. Following the invasion of Poland and the Second World War, Poland had every right to dislike the Germans, especially given the atrocities they had committed on their soil. With a communist puppet government then set up by the Soviet Union, Poland had gained territory from the former German Reich, and began to normalise relations with the new Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR or East Germany). A hard border remained between the two countries, before, during and after the fall of the Iron Curtain. The Iron Curtain had been used to describe the border between East and West during the Cold war. The usage of the term, whilst commonly associated with Winston Churchill during his correspondence with Roosevelt in 1945 and ’46 [6], was actually first conceived by Joseph Goebbels in the Nazi ‘Signal’ Magazine which stated; ‘the iron curtain that more than ever before separates the world from the Soviet Union’[7]. It was therefore known even before the end of the Second World War, that a hard border, will cut through Europe, a fate many nations feared, and one that proved to become a reality. Despite this turbulent past, when Poland joined the EU in 2004, it agreed to become a member of the Schengen area, a policy in which states do away with their borders, to allow the free movement of goods, people, and services a key principle in the European Union’s foundation [8].

Crossing the German/Polish border is as easy as going to the shops for a pint of milk – Politico.Eu

The German-Polish border at Frankfurt an der Oder with Słubice is a prime example of the success of the EU’s eastward expansion in the form of Euro-Regions, and the Schengen area in removing the previously negative associations of division and contestations along the border. Travelling between the two countries, is the same as travelling between any two towns in Europe, you can walk, cycle, drive or catch a bus into the neighbouring town to carry out everyday tasks, then return to your own town. Had someone been dropped into the location without a map, and by removing a few obvious signs, it is incredibly difficult to tell you have crossed a border into a different country. It is often joked that what took a nation’s most powerful army weeks to cross borders, can now be done by a civilian in minutes. There are however criticisms towards this supposedly successful implantation of a border-less Europe. These include who the real source for removing the borders which represent a sign of division is, the EU or Globalisation?

The eastward expansion in 2004, crossed what Samuel Huntington called the ‘fault’ line between the east and west. He argues that ‘In the post-Cold War world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political or economic. They are cultural’[9]. Poland’s past has always tried to associate itself more with the West, and evidence can be seen when it was the UK and not the Soviets, who guaranteed their independence in 1939. Huntingdon goes on to argue that the fault lines, otherwise known as border regions around the world, have been locations of the clash between civilisations. These include historic example of the Christian West against the Muslim Middle East in the wars against the Ottoman Empire and Crusades, and the hard border between North America and Latin America. Borders have always been locations of conflict, division and contestation, and the Border between Poland and Germany, but also with Belarus and Ukraine is no exception [10]. Since the implementation of the EU’s borderless policy, conflicts amongst states along these regions have disappeared amongst member states. Huntingdon’s theory that borders are always conflict zones has been disproved by the collectivised effort of the EU to remove borders, and to thus remove the negative aspects associated with them. Relations between EU nations have remained positive, and any disputes surrounding borders are usually revolved diplomatically. Evidence of this is apparent in the Pro Europa Viadrina Euroregion. As previously mentioned, the convenience to cross between the two towns isn’t there just to make life easier. The project aims to promote the move towards a closer, single European identity. Examples include the European University Viadrina, which is located either side of the Oder river. They show that the working together, and close association can help to alleviate any tension or potential conflicts amongst their neighbours [11].  A greater evaluation of the border regions is provided by the Nijmegen centre for border research which argues that; ‘Borders both separate as well as connect. They define a reciprocal relationship between two neighbours, which accounts for the uniqueness of the area between neighbours and neighbouring countries. Moreover, no border or border area is the same as another’[12].

Huntingtons perception of the world based upon its fault lines

This was in relation to the German-Dutch border, but can still be applied to all borders surrounding Germany. Whilst the border between Poland and Germany may be considered a success, in terms of the outcomes that have been provided. There are still contestations among mainly the elderly populace, who are not used to such an interconnectedness. Borders change countless times, through armed conflicts and political events. For a German born in 1935, they would’ve seen their states borders change five times (Annexation of Austria in 1938, Czechoslovakia in 1939, World War Two, creation of West/East Germany and with reunification [13]. This opposition may be party since the elder generations are often last to associate themselves with globalisation. From a classical realist perspective, it is argued that we live in multi-polar world, with numerous global powers contending for ultimate power. Since the end of the Cold War, the European nations have had a lesser individual role in the world stage, compared to the likes of China, America, or India. In order for continental Europe to remain relevant as a global actor, the European Union has begun to focus more on the political aspects of its union, and has started to show signs evident of a ‘super state’. The EU produces its own currency the Euro, has its own flag, national anthem, police force (in the form of Europol), parliament, and courts. These are all components that are used to create a sovereign state, however this is leading towards the idea to create a ‘United States of Europe’ [14], and partly the reason that prompted the Brexit vote in 2016. The viewpoint of an ever-closer union is also supported by Dr Tassilo Herrschel who states ‘…inside the Union, there is a clear movement, driven by its inherent integrational agenda, towards lowering and, ultimately, removing state borders all together…’[15] Consequently, the eastward expansion of the EU has been interpreted by some states, most notably Russia, as an expansion of the prospective super state. The Russian Federation has, for the past 75 years had a buffer between its borders, and those of western Europe. With the only two states now being Ukraine and Belarus, there are fears that the eastward expansion could result in a return to conflict and division, if as earlier mentioned it crosses into what Huntington called the ‘spheres of influence’[16]. 

Further developing the critical analysis of the eastward expansion, there have been more contemporary examples of the damage that the expansion has caused amongst its borders. In 2014, Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula from the Ukraine through an illegal referendum, after they had decided to announce their support for working closer with the EU rather than Russia. The reasons behind this change in policy and subsequent back turn towards Russia again, led to the Ukrainian revolt in early 2014 that removed pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych from power. Whilst the official reason was that Crimea waned to return to be part of Russia as it was originally presented in 1954 to Ukraine [17], many saw it as a punishment for abandoning Russia. There were condemnations that the EU has encroached with its eastward expansion upon the Ukraine. It is commonly known today, especially with the recent US elections in 2016, that Russia is prone to meddling with the politics of other states. It was known by the EU and other western powers before the annexation that ‘…Moscow impacted upon the electoral regime, trying to influence outcomes by granting overt support to favoured candidates, strongly opposing other candidates, and defending rigged and biased elections of discrediting free and fair elections…’[18] as was described by Jakob Tolstrup when describing the actions of Russia on its neighbouring states. The ensuing fallout of the attempt to expand has created not only a political rift between Eastern and Western Ukraine, but also a physical conflict in the region of Donetsk [19] [20]. Arguably, rather than preventing the theory of borders as lines of divisions and contestations, they have indivertibly contributed in creating them. The EU is always increasing, and as of date, there are currently a handful of states awaiting approval to fully join the Union. One of these include Turkey[21], a geographical location again along one of the fault lines highlighted by Huntingdon[22].

Could the EUs ardent expansionist policy be to blame for the conflict in Ukraine? – Vadim Ghirda/AP

Should the EU fail to learn from the mistakes made with its eastern expansion regarding Russia, and proceeds to make them with the Middle East, then the possibility of conflict and divisions remains high. This new possible route of expansion is full of ethnic and religious tensions along hard borders, with little to no co-operation between the states. An already volatile region full of anti-west sentiment could further be de-stabilised by the EU if it does not recognise the boundaries to which it must confide, predominantly western Europe. However, it would be unfair to entirely blame the conflicts that have risen on Europe’s border with Russia solely on the EU. Since the rise of Authoritarian leader Vladimir Putin, and a supposed start of the ‘second cold war’, with an ever increasingly unpredictable USA, the conditions have been right for Russia to take advantage and regain its international standing it lost back in 1991[23].    

Lastly, to gain a better understanding the effects of the eastward expansion on the perceived nature of borders as lines of divisions and contestations, it would be wise to look at examples in which a borderless attitude has been adopted outside of the initial EU mindset. One such example would be in the UK and its only land border, with the Republic of Ireland. Despite not being in Schengen, but abiding by the rules of the Single Market, the UK removed any customs checks and has an ‘open’ border with the ROI[24]. This border represented division amongst the protestant north and catholic south for much of the troubles. Its full removal following the good Friday agreement, was to promote co-operation between the two sates and remove a physical barrier (although with current Brexit talks it is unclear what the status of this remains to be seen) [25]. Rather than representing the frontier or a distant edge of a country, the idea to have no border at all helps to remove any physical signs of a division. This is the same around all Euro-regions, and the German-Polish border also hopes to remove any physical signs of a division. Globalisation and the rise of social media and technology has left the world more connected than ever before. Borders are no longer the hard-physical conception of the 20th century, but almost an invisible line. As previously mentioned regarding the definition of a state and its sovereignty, when the borders are defined with hard, barriers such as walls and posts, it is easy to see when they are violated or crossed. An immigrant crossing over a wall from Mexico into America can portray a conflict between wealthy North America and poorer Latin America. Yet when you can just walk over a bridge without having to do as much as remove your headphones, it shows the border becoming less a specific ‘line’ and more of a collected region between the two states. The EU’s border between Poland and Germany, is one of countless examples throughout Europe, of two communities coming together through common interests. In Słubice the Police and emergency services work together with their German counterparts, helping to build trust and relations between two communities. This has led to the removal of a common trait where a criminal could ‘flee across the border’. The implications of this are of course with the erosion of state sovereignty, as another states services are used in another country. An example of this is provided in the popular UK comedy TV show ‘Yes Prime Minister!’. When discussing nuclear proliferation, the PM is asked ‘If there was a large fire in West Berlin, and East Berlin firefighters crossed the border to provide help, would you press the button?’. The obvious reply was no, but then it goes on to state ‘The East German police also come, to aid with crowd control, would you fire then?’. Again, the reply is no. The example proves to eventually escalate to Soviet troops replacing the police, and you find yourself with a foreign army on your territory[26]. Whilst only a hypothetical scenario was produced, it still raises series questions surrounding a state sovereignty, and to when would you consider it violated. Indeed, any casus belli would be when a state’s sovereignty is violated[27].   

Would non-European states ever adopt a border less policy? Scene like this on the US/Mexico border could be a thing of the past. Mario Tama/Getty Images

In conclusion, the EU’s eastward expansion has shown to remove the previously felt notions of borders as lines of divisions and contestations. The Euro-regions have meant that previous hard borders, which portray borders as a division have been removed. The communities engage with each other to produce beneficial results on a local level. This local level commitment, when replicated at open border crossings throughout the county, begin to show on a national and eventually international level of co-operation between two states. The example of Frankfurt on der Oder and Słubice is replicated throughout the Schengen area in places such as the Franco-Spanish, Italian-Austro, and Belgium-Dutch borders[28]. As already mentioned, each case is specific, given the historical relations between the two countries. For example, the Franco-German border relations were easier to implement during the cold war, than those with the East. Whilst there are criticisms with the EU’s eastwards expansion regarding the Ukrainian crisis and supposed provocation of the Russians by entering their respected spheres of influence, the examples throughout the continent have shown that the EU’s borderless policy has helped bring nations together and remove the barriers commonly associated surrounding borders. The interconnectedness of these states borders helps in averting conflict, which would prove so catastrophic that the negatives always overwhelm its potential benefits. It was claimed that interconnectedness didn’t help prevent The Great War, however, due to development of a political and economic union, the borders of these states remain open, not only for economic benefits, but for providing transparency and openness with their neighbours. With the removal of borders, it is now possible to maintain peace in Europe, apart from the breakup of Yugoslavia in the 90’s, Europe has remained, for the first time in its history, a peaceful continent[29].

[1] A. Stevenson and M. Waite (2011), ‘Concise Oxford English Dictionary’, 12th Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, p.161.

[2] The Watchtower (2004), ‘The Peace of Westphalia – A Turning Point in Europe’, [Online] Available at: https://wol.jw.org/en/wol/d/r1/lp-e/2004205#h=1. 

[3] Europa, ‘The EU in Brief’, [Online] Available at: https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/eu-in-brief_en.

[4] F.H Hinsley (1986), ‘Sovereignty’, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, p.224.

[5] A. Chakelian (2017), ‘Rise of the Nationalists: A guide to Europe’s far right parties’, [Online] Available at: https://www.newstatesman.com/world/europe/2017/03/rise-nationalists-guide-europe-s-far-right-parties.   

[6] W.S Churchill (1962), ‘The Second World War, Triumph and Tragedy’, Bantam, UK, p. 489.

[7] Signal Issue #8 (May,1943), ‘Hinter dem eisernen Vorhang’, Germany, p.2.

[8] ‘The Schengen acquis – Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders’, BEL-NLD-LUX-FRA-DEU, 14th June 1984, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:42000A0922(01).

[9] S.P Huntington (1996), ‘The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order’, Simon & Schuster Publishing, New York, USA, p.21.

[10] Ibid, pp.21-31.

[11] Viadrina University, ‘Your University’, [Online] Available at: https://study.europa-uni.de/en/studieren/deine-uni/index.html.

[12] H. Houtum, M. Velde, and J. Jacobs (Demographic and economic decline as symptoms of peripherility: Plea for the planning and design of a Borderscape’, [Online] Available at: http://www.academia.edu/2864686/Demographic_and_economic_decline_as_symptoms_of_peripherality_Plea_for_the_planning_and_design_of_a_Borderscape.

[13] BBC News (2017), ‘Germany Profile – Timeline’, [Online] Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17301646

[14] T.R. Reid (2004), ‘The United States of Europe: The New Superpower and end of American supremacy’, Penguin Books, USA, p.305.

[15] T. Herrschel (2011), ‘Borders in Post-Socialist Europe: Territory, Scale, Society’, Ashgate Publishing, England, p.147.

[16] Huntingdon, op.cit, p.20.

[17] K. Calamur (2014), ‘Crimea: A gift to Ukraine becomes a political flash point’, [Online] Available at: https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/02/27/283481587/crimea-a-gift-to-ukraine-becomes-a-political-flash-point.

[18] J. Tolstrup (2014), ‘Russia vs. the EU’, First Forum Press, Colorado, USA, p.241.

[19] Unknown (2014), ‘UKRAINE PRE-ELECTION POLL SHOWS STRONG OPPOSITION TO RUSSIAN AGGRESSION, SUPPORT FOR KYIV GOVERNMENT’, Archived, [Online] Available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20141016232411/http://www.iri.org/news-events-press-center/news/iri-ukraine-pre-election-poll-shows-strong-opposition-russian-aggressi.  

[20] Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2017), ‘Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 4 January 2017’, [Online] Available at: http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/292676.

[21] BBC News (2014), ‘EU Enlargement: The next seven’, [Online] Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11283616.

[22] Huntington, op.cit, p.21.

[23] S. Ramani (2015), ‘Huffington Post: Robert Legvold on the New Cold War, Interview with Columbia University Professor and Leading Russia Scholar’, [Online] Available at: https://www.huffingtonpost.com/samuel-ramani/robert-legvold-on-the-new_b_8514120.html.

[24] G. Denton and T. Fahy (1993), ‘The Northern Ireland Land Boundary, 1923-1992’, Customhouses, Belfast, UK, p.3.

[25] European Commission (2017), ‘Guiding principles transmitted to EU27 for the Dialogue on Ireland/Northern Ireland’, [Online] Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/guiding-principles-dialogue-ei-ni_en.pdf

[26] BBC One, ‘Yes Prime Minister’, Series: 1, Episode: 1 Originally aired: 9th January 1983, Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JKbDKsNsjac. 

[27] A. Stevenson and M. Waite, op.cit, p.221.

[28] Revolvy, ‘List of Euroregions’, [Online] Available at: https://www.revolvy.com/main/index.php?s=List%20of%20euroregions&item_type=topic.

[29] Europa, ‘A peaceful Europe- the beginnings of co-operation’, [Online] Available at: https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history/1945-1959_en.  

The war against Fascism is far from over

Are anonymous images like these harmless in mocking Nigel Farage, or does it show a resurgence in fanatical support for an authoritarian leader? 

The Liberal State is a mask behind which there is no face; it is a scaffolding behind which there is no building.

— Benito Mussolini, Speech in Milan, Italy, October 6th 1922.

It was an ideology our grandparents and the free world dedicated their lives and futures into defeating; an ideology that caused the worst war in the history of humanity and resulted in the systematic murder of millions on a horrific scale. Yet for some, Fascism is seen as a new appealing alternative to the political systems offered by the current establishment.

The rising fear of terrorism post 9/11, controversial wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and a feeling of disenfranchisement felt by the traditional working class have laid the roots for Fascism to return, under a new alias; the Alt-Right. A movement that has spent years quietly building up, and 2016 was its time to shine.

A resurgence of fanatical nationalism inspired by Brexit has shaken the hornet’s nest. The West must now deal with a mentality that should’ve died in 1945 in a bunker under the Reich Chancellery.

The two men responsible for the biggest shift of the political landscape this century, Nigel Farage (L) & Donald Trump (R) – Gerald Herbert/AP

The flame of Fascism was forced underground following the end of the war, but sadly it still burns strong in the hearts and minds of some. Many of the Fascist ideals that spark a movement, such as surveillance and migrant xenophobia have become more prominent and seen as justifiable following the UKs referendum on its EU membership in June 2016. [1]

In the UK there have been a string of small fascist parties and movements throughout the decades, including the likes of National Front, British National Party and National Action. These parties have struggled with electoral success and have only managed a handful of councillors elected between them.[2]

So how has the EU referendum help to facilitate a rise in Fascism you may ask, especially if political parties can’t gain enough Fascist electoral support? Well firstly, we need to try and understand what Fascism is. The concept is unique to each country that adopts it and is often used to loosely describe a government type. It is best described by J.W Aldridge who states it’s ‘a political philosophy, movement, or regime that exalts nation and often race above the individual and that it stands for a centralised autocratic government headed by a dictatorial leader, severe economic and social regimentation, and forcible suppression of opposition’[3].

With that understood, many of its features are seen in dealing with the Brexit referendum. I want to state that this definition does not apply to all leave voters, and indeed there are many logical and reasonable reasons for voting to leave the EU. However, these legitimate concerns are brushed aside by the closet fascists. There are constant connotations between Brexit and a return to the glory days, the days of Empire, Imperialism, British racial and economic supremacy over minorities and foreigners. British university professors Sally Tomlinson and Danny Dorling have called Brexit the “last gasp of the British Empire”. [4]

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Labour MP Jo Cox was killed by a far right extremist on the 16th June 2016, just 1 week before the vote – HUDDERSFIELD EXAMINER/JOHN MATHER/SKY NEWS

Surely some could argue that this is just nostalgia from the elderly population. But this doesn’t excuse the countless television and radio interviews with Brexit supporters who time and time again utter words along the lines of ‘send ’em all back to their own country’. [5] This hatred has spilled over into violence. Just as the Nazi Brownshirts would kill or attack those they saw as trying to undermine Germanys future, we have seen similar events, such as the tragic murder of Jo Cox, a remain supporting Labour MP. [6] Her death was at the hands of someone who believed Jo Cox was a threat to the UK and White people by being a defender of the European Union. 

Furthermore, there are stark connotations between the Battle of Cable Street in 1936 and protests by far-right leave supporting organisations such as the English Defence League (EDL) or United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in March 2019. Both events involved violent confrontations with the police, with Mosley’s Fascists in 1936 and Tommy Robinsons Fascists in 2019 both fighting for what they believe was to the benefit and future of British citizens. [7] [8] 

During time of economic hardship, the right and nationalist parties begin to gain support, this was evident just after the 2008 financial crash in which the BNP saw an increase in support, even resulting in Nick Griffin appearing on BBC Question time.[9] We all know how that went.

103888154_hate_crime_640_chart_v2-nc
Since 2016, there’s been a steady rise in recorded Hate Crimes

What would be the solution in dealing with a fanatical ideology which has become more and more prevalent in British society over the years? It appears we need to adopt the same actions that previous generations did when it came to De-Nazification of Germany after the war. As Tony Blair put it in 1997; Education, Education, Education. A lot of the fascist sentiments fostered by Brits comes from a lack of knowledge or understanding.

Fascism undoubtedly results in persecution of minorities. Individuals needs to learn from previous examples throughout history, not just from Nazi Germany, but also those who lived under Franco’s rule in Spain or under Petain in Vichy France. Those who don’t learn from the past are doomed to repeat it [10]. Fascists take different characteristics from their predecessors, and try to contextualise it for their current issues, such as Muslims being the threat not Jews. By looking at the issue from a historical perspective we can see how the issues were dealt with in the 20th century and better tune them for the 21st.

The worst thing to do, is to do nothing.  

[1] Michael Niman, ‘Five forces driving the rise of Fascism in 2019’, January 13th 2019, Truth Out, [Online] Available at: https://truthout.org/articles/five-forces-driving-the-rise-of-fascism-in-2019/.

[2] Thomas P. Linehan, ‘British fascism, 1918-39: parties, ideology and culture’, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2000), pp. 166.

[3] J.W Aldridge, ‘Definition of Fascism’, Merriam Webster, [Online] Available at: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fascism.

[4] The Week, ‘Brexit: What’s the British Empire got to do with it?’, May 31st 2019, [Online] Available at: https://www.theweek.co.uk/101512/brexit-what-s-the-british-empire-got-to-do-with-it.

[5] Vice News, ‘Why did England’s North vote to Leave the European Union?’, 1st July 2016, [Online] Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d1zL3wDLyXk.

[6] The Telegraph, 17th June 2016, pp. 1-2.

[7] Nigel Jones, ‘Mosley’, (Haus Publishing, 2004), p. 114.

[8] Damien Gayle, ‘Anti-Racist Marchers claim victory over far right protest’, December 9th 2018, [Online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/dec/09/antiracist-marchers-in-london-claim-they-had-more-than-double-the-support-of-far-right-protest.

[9] Mark Thompson, ‘Keeping Nick Griffin off air is a job for Parliament not the BBC’, The Guardian, October 21st 2009, [Online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/oct/21/question-time-bbc-bnp-griffin.

[10] George Santayana, ‘The life of reason: The phases of Human Progress’, (Library of Alexandria, 1905).

A Brief Introduction

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I’ve been studying a Bachelor of Arts Honours Degree in History and Politics at the University of Westminster in London since 2016. My key areas of interest are British Foreign Policy in the 20th century, as well as the rise of Fascism in the 1930’s throughout Europe.

In this blog, I shall share my academic work from over the years, including previously submitted essays. The essays have been graded as a first (70 marks or above out of 100)

I’m currently working on my dissertation, which aims to focus on Anglo-East German relation between 1985-1989. The work will explore a variety of aspects, including the British-GDR society, roles of Trade Unions and the impact Military Attachés had, notable The British Commanders’-in-Chief Mission to the Soviet Forces in Germany (BRIXMIS) who were present in the GDR.

This blog shall be dedicated to sharing my academic work, both past and present.

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